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Abstract
While databases provide capabilities to enforce security and privacy policies, two 
15 major issues still prevent applications from safely delegating such policies to the 
database. The first one is the loss of user identity in multitiered environments which 
renders the database security features of little to no value. The second issue is the unsafe 
coexistence between the security capabilities and fundamental database tenets which 
creates data leakage vulnerabilities. This paper proposes extensions to database systems 
20 to allow applications, such as those used in managing the operations of energy clouds, 
to safely delegate the security and privacy policies to the database. This delegation 
reduces complexity for applications and improves overall data security and privacy. 
Our performance evaluation shows that almost all the TPC-H queries perform the same 
or better when the security policy is enforced by the database. For the set of queries that 
25 performed better, the improvement observed ranges from 8 to 68%.
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1. Introduction
30 Transitioning to an energy cloud is a significant challenge. This network of networks 
needs to be optimized to reduce cost and ensure overall security. This would also 
include reducing the complexity of building applications to manage the operations of 
energy cloud such as those related to customer relationship management. This type of 
applications has traditionally become quite complex partly due to the cost of 
35 implementing data security and privacy rules within the application logic itself. Fig. 1 
shows the architecture of a classical 3-tier application, where the end user browsers, the 





Fig. 1. Classical 3-tier application architecture and related security issues.
Under this model, end users access the application to perform tasks related to their 
job. The application authenticates such users to ensure they are authorized to use the 
55 application. To meet the needs of the end users, the application makes a connection to 
the database using a generic user ID identifying that application to the database. To 
ensure that the right content of the database is returned to the right users, the application 
logic typically includes a fine-grained authorization layer to do the appropriate level of 
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data filtering. This layer is usually implemented in one or a combination of these two 
60 options:
 The application builds the SQL queries in such a way that they include the 
appropriate predicates and functions to filter out and mask the table data as 
appropriate.
 The application builds a set of database views which perform the 
65 appropriate level of data filtering and routes the SQL queries to the 
appropriate views based on user identities.
Besides burdening the application with the task of implementing fine-grained 
authorization, this model also suffers from other security drawbacks including:
 The approach is not data centric. This means that the intended security 
70 policy is not enforced when the application is bypassed. An example of 
such bypass is when the application administrator chooses to abuse the 
application’s database user ID to access the database directly. This is 
particularly important in today's world where internal threats are as 
concerning as external threats [1], [2].
75  Over granting of database privileges. The application’s database user ID is 
typically granted the privileges of a database administrator so that it can be 
used to do all things on behalf of all users. This means that when such user 
ID is abused, the consequences to the organization can be severe.
 Loss of end user identity at the database level. This is a consequence of the 
80 application doing all database accesses on behalf of all users using a single 
user ID. This makes it impossible to leverage database auditing to hold end 
users accountable for their actions. It also prevents the application from 
delegating the fine-grained authorization policy to the database as the user 
ID is lost at that level.
85  Unnecessary exposure of the security policy to application developers.
We contend that applications complexity can be reduced by delegating the fine-
grained authorization task to the database system. We also contend that this delegation 
will additionally address the security concerns raised above and enable applications to 
better adhere to compliance mandates such as the European General Data Protection 
90 Regulation (GDPR) [3] and the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI 
DSS) [4]. 
The crux of our contribution is the design of a holistic fine-grained database 
authorization approach which allows organizations to reduce the complexity of their 
applications and improve overall database security. We have also implemented the 
95 solution in a commercial database system (IBM DB2) [5]. Our approach improves over 
the state of the art as follows:
 Fine-grained authorization coexists in harmony with fundamental database 
tenets such as performance and integrity so that organizations are not forced 
to make compromises either on the security side or on the database side.
100  Applications can safely delegate the security policy to the database system by 
leveraging the trusted context concept to propagate user identities to the 
database system, thus extending the value of fine-grained database 
authorization to multitiered applications.
 Organizations can leverage the trusted context concept to ensure that the 
105 application’s database user ID cannot be abused by malicious entities who 
may want to leverage that user ID for accessing the database outside the scope 
of the application (i.e., application bypass). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work. 
Section 3 describes our fine-grained database authorization model. Section 4 introduces 
110 our trusted context concept which addresses the loss of user identity problem in 
multitiered environments. In section 5, we discuss how the new concepts introduced 
safely coexist with core database tenets. Section 6 describes the performance evaluation 
of our fine-grained database authorization model. In Section 7, we discuss a banking 
use case and show how our solution meets its requirements. Lastly, Section 8 
115 summarizes our approach and outlines our future work.
2. Related work
Traditionally, fine-grained authorization in database systems has been implemented 
using the concept of database views [6]. Like database views, our approach is an 
extension to SQL and is declarative in nature. Administrators are not expected to write 
120 any code to implement the fine-grained authorization rules. However, our solution 
improves over database views in two main ways. First, our approach defines the row 
and column controls directly on the database tables themselves. This means that the 
row and column authorization is always enforced regardless of whether the table is 
accessed directly or indirectly through a database view. In contrast, when implementing 
125 fine-grained authorization using views, the row and column authorization is enforced 
only when the access is made through those views. In other words, views do not provide 
any protection when the underlying tables are accessed directly. Additionally, our 
approach introduced the notion of trusted context to enable user identity propagation in 
multitiered environments so that applications can safely delegate fine-grained 
130 authorization to the database system.
Oracle Virtual Private Database (VPD) was, to the best of our knowledge, the first 
database system to introduce a fine-grained authorization model that improves over 
traditional database views [7] and is the closest to our work. There are however some 
important differences between Oracle VPD and our approach. First, the Oracle VPD 
135 approach is not declarative. It requires the administrator to code a PL/SQL program 
which computes a predicate string that is appended to any SQL statement accessing the 
table with which the PL/SQL program was associated. This also limits the benefits of 
SQL statements caching only to situations where the PL/SQL program is guaranteed to 
return the same results for all users. Our approach does not limit the benefits of SQL 
140 statements caching because it does not change the SQL statement text itself. Oracle 
VPD also includes the notion of an Application Context which can be used by 
applications to pass information to the database system such as a user ID in a multitiered 
environment. An Application Context is a set of name-value pairs the Oracle database 
systems stores in memory. Our trusted context concept provides a more robust 
145 framework for propagating user identities in multitiered environments as it first requires 
the establishment of a trusted relationship between the database system and the 
application before propagating a user ID is allowed. It also provides more control on 
which specific user IDs are allowed for propagation as well as the ability to associate 
the application’s privileges with the trusted context only so they cannot be abused 
150 elsewhere. 
The Row Level Security (RLS) and Dynamic Data Masking (DDM) capabilities in 
Microsoft SQL Server are conceptually similar to our row permission and column mask 
concepts [8]. But there are some important differences between the two approaches. 
First, the SQL Server DDM is static in the sense that the user either has access to the 
155 actual value in the column or a masked value thereof. The column mask concept in our 
approach is dynamic in the sense that the decision of whether the user sees the actual 
value, or a masked value is determined dynamically based on the conditions expressed 
in the column mask definition. Additionally, the SQL Server RLS requires the 
administrator to go through a two-step process: They first need to create a function 
160 which returns a filtering predicate, and then create a policy on the table to apply that 
predicate. In our approach, this is all done in a single step using the row permission 
concept. The user identity propagation in multitiered environments is supported through 
an application context concept similar to the Oracle VPD one discussed above.
The Vertica Row Access Policy (RAP) and Column Access Policy (CAP) concepts 
165 enable administrators to enforce access to table data at the row and column level 
respectively. The Vertica SQL syntax is very similar to ours. However, and to the best 
of our knowledge, the Vertica solution does not discuss how it enables user identity 
propagation in multitiered environments. Additionally, the Vertica solution does not 
show any performance evaluation to contrast implementing the fine-grained 
170 authorization rules within the database versus within the application.
The Sybase Row Level Access Control (RLAC) enables administrators to restrict 
access to data rows in a table by defining an access rule and binding it to a specific 
column of the table [9]. When a table is accessed, the access rules in place are 
automatically enforced by incorporating them into the query at compilation time. Our 
175 approach differs from the Sybase RLAC capability in several ways. First, RLAC is 
limited to row level access control only while our approach covers both the row and 
column level. Also, to the best our knowledge, the Sybase RLAC does not discuss how 
it enables user identity propagation in multitiered environments.
The fine-grained authorization model presented in [10] is also a declarative SQL 
180 model like ours. But there are some differences between the two approaches. The first 
difference is fairly minor. They have extended the GRANT SQL statement to give 
administrators the tools to define row and column authorization rules while our 
approach introduced these constructs independently of the GRANT statement. 
However, the work presented in [10] did not cover user identity propagation in 
185 multitiered environments. It assumed it was taken care of through a method similar to 
the application context concept in Oracle VPD. Lastly, their work did not include any 
performance evaluation to contrast implementing the fine-grained authorization rules 
within the database versus within the application.
The fine-grained authorization approach discussed in [11] is also a declarative SQL 
190 model but there are some key differences with our approach. First, the focus of the work 
in [11] is on privacy policies. They introduced row and column restriction concepts for 
the purpose of being able to map privacy policies to them so the database system can 
automatically enforce privacy policies. It did not cover user identity propagation in 
multitiered environment. Also, the model described in [11] did not include any 
195 performance evaluation to contrast enforcing the privacy policy within the database 
versus within the application.
The model described in [12] can be regarded as a special form of fine-grained 
authorization. The focus of this work is more around introducing a flexible mandatory 
access control model which addresses some of the shortcoming of classical Multilevel 
200 Security [13]. It is a declarative SQL model and also ensures the security predicates are 
executed before any potentially unsafe predicates to prevent data leakage. However, it 
did not introduce the concept of secure functions as we did in this paper, so security 
predicates are always executed first even if that does not make sense from a 
performance perspective. Lastly, the approach discussed in [12] did not cover user 
205 identity propagation in multitiered environments.
Besides security built into database systems themselves, the importance of protecting 
databases has also led to the emergence of external database security tools. The leading 
tools in this context are Guardium and Imperva [14]. These tools can be thought of as 
complementary to our solution as they focus more on database auditing, compliance 
210 reporting and analytics on auditing data as opposed to fine-grained database 
authorization.
3. Fine-grained database authorization model
We extend the SQL table privileges model with two new concepts: Row permissions 
and column masks. Row permissions and column masks implement a second layer of 
215 security on top of table privileges. When a table is accessed, the privileges layer 
determines whether or not the table can be accessed. Next, row permissions are applied 
to decide what specific set of the table rows the user is authorized to access. Lastly, 
column masks are applied to figure out whether the user is allowed to see the actual 
value in a column or a masked value thereof. For example, row permissions ensure that 
220 when a doctor queries the patients table, they only see rows that represent patients under 
their care. On the other hand, a column mask on the phone number column ensures that 
the doctor sees only phone numbers for patients who consented to share their phone 





Fig. 2. Fine-grained authorization implemented in the SQL compiler.
An SQL statement first goes through the parser component where it is analyzed for 
syntactic correctness and a query graph is generated. Next, it goes into the query rewrite 
240 component where the graph is modified to inject additional objects such as integrity 
constraints and triggers. We have modified this component to inject the new row 
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goes into the query optimizer component where several execution options are 
examined, and the optimal plan is selected based on a cost function. We have also 
245 modified this component to protect against potential data leakage should an unsafe 
predicate be evaluated before the security rules expressed by the row permissions are 
evaluated.
Unlike database views [6] where the security policy is enforced only when the views 
themselves are accessed, row permissions and column masks are table centric. This 
250 ensures that the security policy is enforced consistently regardless of how the table is 
accessed. Row permissions and column masks are also applied uniformly across all 
users, including DBAs, which helps organizations better adhere to zero-trust security 
[15], [16], [17] and in particular ensuring that access control is based on “need-to-
know”. Additionally, row permissions and column masks are application transparent. 
255 Database applications can immediately benefit from these concepts without having to 
incur any code changes. The SQL syntax for row permissions and column masks is 
given below.
create permission permission-name on table-x
260   for rows where predicate-clause
  enforced for all access [disable | enable]
create mask mask-name on table-x
  for column column-name
265   return case-expression [disable | enable]
Example 1
The following row permission creates a rule that grants access to rows in the 
PAYROLL table only to users who are members of the HR role.
270 create permission rpayroll on payroll
  for rows where verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘HR’) = 1
  enforced for all access enable; 
Example 2
275 The following column mask creates a rule that grants access to the salary column in 
the PAYROLL table only to users who are members of the SM role. Other users will 
see NULL when they query the salary column.
create mask msalary on payroll
280   for column salary 
  return case when verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘SM’) = 1
         then salary
         else null
               end
285             enable;
Some applications may not desire receiving a NULL value. Instead, they may want 
to receive an alternate and format preserving data value [18]. Our model can easily 
support this use case. All that is needed is to register a User Defined Function (UDF) 
290 in the database and modify the CREATE MASK SQL statement above such that instead 
of returning NULL, call the UDF to return the desired output.
A table can have zero or more row permissions. When more than a single row 
permission is defined on a table, the predicates from each one of them are combined 
together by applying the logical OR operator. In other words, if a row permission R1 
295 gives user U1 access to a set of rows S1, and another row permission R2 on the same 
table gives that same user access to another set of rows S2, then both row permissions 
would give that user access to the union of S1 and S2. A column can have zero or one 
mask. We extended the SQL compiler so that during query compilation, row 
permissions and column masks are dynamically injected into the query graph. This 
300 ensures that the query execution plan generated automatically enforces the rules 
expressed by the row permissions and column masks.
3.1 Row permissions enforcement
Row permissions defined on a given table are automatically applied when that table 
is accessed through any table level SQL statements: SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, 
305 DELETE, and MERGE.
For SELECT statements, the predicates from all the row permissions defined on the 
table are combined together through the logical OR operator to derive a master 
predicate. This master predicate acts as a filter to limit the set of rows returned. We 
extended the query optimizer component of the SQL compiler to ensure that this master 
310 predicate is evaluated before any other unsafe user predicates. This is important to guard 
against potential data leakage through such unsafe user predicates. For example, 
suppose there is a UDF which emails the table rows retrieved to some external party. If 
such UDF appears in a user predicate and that predicate is executed before the master 
predicate, then by the time the master predicate is applied it will already be too late as 
315 the row would have already been sent out
For INSERT statements, the rules specified in the row permissions defined on that 
table are used to determine whether or not the row can be inserted into the table. To 
qualify, the user attempting to insert the row must be able to retrieve it back through a 
SELECT statement. This semantic is analogous to how symmetric database views 
320 behave. More specifically, a user is not allowed to insert a row they cannot retrieve 
back.
For UPDATE statements, the rules specified in the row permissions defined on that 
table are used to determine whether or not the row can be updated. This is a two-step 
process. First, the row permissions are used to filter out the set of rows that can be 
325 updated. In other words, a user cannot update rows they are not allowed to see. Next, 
the updated rows (if any) must conform to the same semantic as for INSERT processing 
to ensure that the user does not inject rows they cannot retrieve back.
For DELETE statements, the rules specified in the row permissions defined on that 
table are used to filter the set of rows that can be deleted in order to ensure that the user 
330 can only delete rows they can see.
A MERGE statement can be thought of as a combination of an INSERT and an 
UPDATE statements. Therefore, a MERGE statement is processed as an INSERT when 
dealing with new rows and as an UPDATE when dealing with existing rows in the table.
3.2 Column masks enforcement
335 The goal of a column mask defined on a given column C1 is to ensure that when C1 
appears in the final results set of a query, C1 values are masked out if the user is not 
authorized to see them. This has two important implications. First, the SQL compiler 
will enforce the column mask for SELECT statements only. INSERT, UPDATE, 
DELETE, and MERGE statements do not return a result set to the user, so the column 
340 mask does not apply in these cases. Secondly, the SQL compiler must ensure that the 
enforcement of a column mask does not break database applications as this can have 
severe business impact. For example, suppose that a column mask is applied when the 
column appears in a predicate. This may totally change the final results set and the 
database application may end up processing a different set of rows (e.g. giving a raise 
345 to the wrong employees). Consequently, we have extended the SQL compiler such that 
column masks do not interfere with the computation of the final results set and the order 
or grouping thereof. More specifically, column masks are not applied when the column 
appears in any of these situations: WHERE clauses, GROUP BY clauses, HAVING 
clauses, SELECT DISTINCT, and ORDER BY clauses. One consequence of this 
350 approach is that it may create opportunities for inferences. But as discussed in our threat 
model section, we focus on application access as opposed to free direct SQL access to 
the database. Furthermore, the trusted context concept introduced in this paper enables 
establishing a trusted relationship between the application and the database server as 
well as protecting against abuse of the application’s database user ID.
355 4. User identity propagation in multitiered environments
In multitiered environments, the middle tier application serves the needs of several 
users over a pooled database connection. Under this model, the database server only 
sees a generic user ID which identifies the middle tier application, not the actual users 
of that application. Despite being a very popular application model, the fact that the 
360 database server only sees a generic user ID for all accesses poses several challenges.
First, the middle tier application cannot benefit from fine-grained database 
authorization because the database server does not see the identity of the application 
user. Thus, instead of delegating the authorization burden to the database server where 
it can be enforced more effectively, the middle tier application is forced to implement 
365 that fine-grained authorization in the application itself. This renders the application 
more complex, exposes the security policy to application programmers, and forces 
unnecessary patching of the application each time the security policy needs to be 
updated.
Additionally, using a single user ID for all database accesses diminishes user 
370 accountability. For example, one of the very first tasks in a forensic investigation is to 
check the database audit logs for gaining insight into user activities. However, if all 
accesses by all users are made using a single user ID, the database audit log would 
unfortunately provide little to no value.
The naïve approach to address this issue is to have the middle tier application 
375 establish a separate database connection for each user. Unfortunately, this approach 
may not be always feasible as the middle tier application may not have access to the 
end user database credentials. Additionally, even if this were feasible, this approach 
would not be desirable as establishing a large set of database connections would 
introduce a database performance overhead. This is the overhead associated with user 
380 authentication and the setting of the actual connection structures on the database server 
side.
Clearly, a better approach is needed for relieving the middle tier application from the 
burden of enforcing fine-grained authorization, and for holding users accountable for 
their actions.
385 4.1 Trusted contexts
We extend database systems by introducing a new concept called trusted context. A 
trusted context is a database object which defines a trust relationship between the 
database server and an external entity such as a middle tier application server. The trust 
relationship allows the database security administrator (DBSECADM) to specify a set 
390 of conditions which, when satisfied by a database connection request, instructs the 
database server to internally mark that database connection as trusted. A trusted 
connection gives the entity that established such connection a set of privileges that are 
not available outside the scope of that trusted connection. One example of such 
privileges is the ability to reuse an existing database connection for a different user 
395 without having to re-authenticate that user at the database server. Reusing an existing 
database connection avoids incurring a performance overhead by eliminating the need 
to establish a new database connection. Therefore, a middle tier application server can 
take advantage of the trusted context concept to establish an initial trusted connection, 
and then reuse that trusted connection to propagate an end user identity to the database 
400 server before submitting database requests on behalf of that end user.
The DBSECADM can choose from a variety of attributes to set the conditions for a 
trusted relationship such as a user ID, an IP address, a domain name, a digital certificate, 
and the type of encryption used to protect the communication channel between the 
database server and the middle tier application (e.g., SSL). The SQL language syntax 
405 for our trusted context concept is given below. 
create trusted context context-name
  based upon connection using system authid authorization-id
  attributes key-value-pair-list
410   default role role-name
  with use for user | role | group name [without authentication | 
  with authentication] [role role-name] 
  [disable | enable]
415
Example 3
The following trusted context establishes a trusted relationship between the database 
server and a middle tier application. The attributes upon which this trusted relationship 
is based are the user ID identifying the middle tier application itself, the IP address of 
420 the server where that application is hosted, and the type of communication encryption 
used to protect the communication channel between the database server and the middle 
tier application.
create trusted context ctx1 
425   based upon connection using system authid midtierApp1
  attributes (address ‘174.94.142.56’ encryption ‘SSL’)
  with use for role midtierApp1Users
  without authentication
  enable;
430
In our implementation of trusted contexts in IBM DB2, we have extended the 
database server connection processing as follows. When a database connection request 
is received, we go through the authentication process as usual, but we also compare the 
attributes of that request with the attributes of the trusted context objects defined at that 
435 database server.  If there is a match, we mark that connection as trusted. We have also 
extended the DB2 Command Level Interface (CLI) with a new command to give 
applications the option to request switching the current user ID on a trusted database 
connection. On the database server side, when such request is received, we first verify 
this is within the scope of a trusted connection, and then ensure that the user ID to 
440 switch to is authorized as per the trusted context object definition. For example, the 
trusted context definition above states that it is only permitted to switch to users who 
are members of the role midtierApp1Users. Lastly, we also check whether the trusted 
context definition authorizes switching users without authentication or requires 
authentication. If authentication is not required as in example 3 above, then no further 
445 processing is required. Otherwise, the switch user request must provide a valid 
authentication credential. Once the checks above are completed and the switch user 
request is authorized, we reset the user environment over the current physical 
connection to match the new user, and the application is now ready to start sending 
database commands under the scope of this new user.
450 Also, in order to ensure database integrity is not compromised, we extended the 
database server processing such that switching users over a trusted connection is 
permitted only on transaction boundary. If such a request is made outside of a 
transaction boundary, the current transaction is rolled back, and the connection is put 
in an unconnected state, thus giving the middle tier application the opportunity to 
455 recover.
4.2 Trusted context-based authorization
Traditionally, database security models are such that the privileges granted to a user are 
universally applicable irrespective of any context. For example, if a user is granted SELECT 
privilege on the payroll database table, that user could exercise that privilege regardless of 
460 how they gain access to the database. The lack of control on when a privilege is available to 
a user can weaken overall security since the privilege may be abused. For example, an 
application administrator may choose to use the application’s database credentials to 
connect to the database directly and make changes that are contrary to the application 
business logic.
465 To provide control over when privileges may be exercised, we extend the trusted 
context concept so that a DBSECADM can associate one or more roles with a trusted 
context. Roles that are associated with a trusted context are only exercisable when the 
user is acting within the scope of a trusted connection based upon that trusted context. 
This enables organizations to better adhere to zero-trust security, and in particular the 
470 “verify and never trust” tenet as the database system verifies more security attributes 
before granting a role to user [15], [16].
Example 4
The definition of the following trusted context is similar to example 3, but it specifies 
475 two database roles. The first role is DBCONNECT which the DBSECADM decided not 
to grant to the user ID midtierApp1. Instead, they assigned it to this trusted context. This 
means that if the application administrator were to abuse this user ID by attempting to 
connect to the database from a server other than what is stated in the trusted context 
definition, that connection will be refused by the database server. The second role is 
480 HR, which is the role that grants access to the content of the payroll table as per the row 
authorization in example 1. This in turn means that members of the HR role will have 
access to the payroll table only within the scope of the trusted connection based upon 
this trusted context. In other words, they will only have access when they are using the 
application and not otherwise.
485
create trusted context ctx1
  based upon connection using system authid midtierApp1
  attributes (address ‘srv.dep.org.com’ encryption ‘SSL’)
  default role DBCONNECT 
490   with use for role midtierApp1Users
  without authentication HR
  enable;
In our implementation of trusted context-based authorization in IBM DB2, we have 
495 extended the database server authorization model as follows. When a database 
connection request is matched with a trusted context object, we check if there are any 
default roles assigned to that trusted context and add them to the user’s roles list so they 
are used when deciding whether or not the user is authorized to connect to the database. 
Similarly, when a request to switch the current user on a trusted connection is received, 
500 we check if the trusted context definition grants any roles to the user to switch to and 
add any such roles to the new user’s roles list accordingly.
5. Safe coexistence with fundamental database tenets
Database security needs to safely coexist with fundamental database tenets. Failure 
to do so may create database vulnerabilities and limit adoption of the solution.
505 5.1 User defined functions
A User Defined Function (UDF) is an important database concept which applications 
depend upon to delegate certain tasks to the database system. We extended the database 
system such that, by default, the row permission predicates are evaluated first to avoid 
potential data leakage through UDFs that may also appear in the set of predicates to 
510 apply on the table. The following experiment illustrates this extension and can be 
consistently repeated on any recent IBM DB2 system. The experiment creates a table 
T1 with 2 integer columns A and B. It inserts 3 rows into this table (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3). 
Then, we create a UDF which replaces any value in column A that is greater than 1 by 
1. When we run the simple SQL query SELECT A, B FROM T1 WHERE F1(A) = 1, 
515 we expectedly obtain 3 rows because the values 2 and 3 in column A are changed to 1 
by the UDF F1. Then we create a row permission with the predicate “A = 1”. Now, 
when we run the SELECT query above any number of times, we consistently get back 
a single row. This is because our design ensures that the row permission predicates are 
executed before any unsafe UDF predicate. This is how data leakage is prevented 
520 because the UDF could have done anything with the data rows such as modifying them 
to alter the results set (as F1 does). But our design ensures that the UDF only sees the 
rows which are authorized for the user running the SELECT query. Below are the exact 
steps. 
525 create table T1 (A int, B int);
insert into T1 values (1,1), (2,2), (3,3);
create function F1 (A int) returns int
  language SQL contains SQL no external action deterministic
  return (case when A > 1 then 1 else A end);
530 select A, B from T1 where F1(A) = 1;
create permission P1 on T1 
 for rows where A = 1 
 enforced for all access 
enable;
535 select A, B from T1 where F1(A) = 1;
While executing the UDF predicate last is good from a security perspective, it may 
not be necessarily good from a performance perspective, particularly if the UDF is a 
trusted function. Therefore, we extended the database system with the concept of secure 
UDF. By default, a UDF is not secure, but the administrator can alter the definition of 
540 a UDF to mark it secure. This means that the administrator confirms that the UDF is 
trusted. When a UDF is secure, the database system can order the evaluation of 
predicates based on such UDF anywhere the SQL compiler sees fit. Secure UDF enable 
performance and database security to coexist in harmony.
5.2 Materialized query tables
545 A Materialized Query Table (MQT) is a special type of database table which contains 
the results set of an SQL query. It is a critical database concept DBAs depend upon to 
maintain high performance for complex SQL queries. So, why does the design of 
database security need to pay attention to MQT? Suppose that the DBA creates an MQT 
M1 based on an SQL query affecting two tables T1 and T2. Further, suppose that table 
550 T1 is protected through a set of row permissions and column masks. If such row 
permissions and column masks are applied during the creation of MQT M1, the content 
of that MQT becomes dependent on what its creator can or cannot see in base table T1. 
This would negatively affect the accuracy of the database system’s answers. For 
example, if the database system decides to use M1 to answer a query from a user U1, 
555 that user may get more data or less data than what they are authorized depending on 
whether they have access to more data or less data in base table T1 than the creator of 
MQT M1. A better approach is therefore to not enforce the row permissions and column 
masks on T1 during the creation of MQT M1 (or subsequent automatic refresh of its 
content). But we need to make sure that security is not compromised when doing so. In 
560 this context, we have extended the database system such that:
 Upon the creation of an MQT, the database system automatically generates 
and applies a default row permission with the false predicate “1 = 0”. This 
ensures that direct SQL access to the MQT is blocked (i.e., “1 = 0” always 
evaluates to false). If certain users have a business need to access the MQT 
565 directly, the administrator can create the appropriate row permissions on 
the MQT to give them access. Any such row permissions or column masks 
are enforced only during direct access to the MQT.
 When the database system decides to answer a user query from an MQT, it 
always ensures that any row permissions and column masks on any base 
570 table upon which the MQT is defined are automatically carried over and 
applied on the MQT itself. This ensures that users do not inadvertently get 
access to data in the base tables for which they are not authorized.
 The following experiment illustrates how direct access to an MQT is automatically 
blocked when its underlying base table is protected by a row permission. This 
575 experiment can be consistently repeated on any recent IBM DB2 system.  First, we 
create a table T1 with 2 integer columns A and B. We then insert 3 rows into this table, 
namely (1,1), (2,2) and (3,3). Next, we create an MQT M1 based on table T1. When we 
run the statement SELECT A FROM M1, we get the exact same data in base table T1. 
On the other hand, if we protect T1 with a row permission and retry that exact same 
580 statement, we now get zero rows returned. This is because our design automatically 
protects the MQT M1 to guard against data leakage. Below are the exact steps. 
create table T1 (A int, B int);
insert into T1 values (1,1), (2,2), (3,3);
585 create table M1 (a, b) as (select A, avg(B) from T1 group by A) 
           data initially deferred refresh deferred maintained by system;
refresh table M1;
select A from M1;
create permission P1 on T1 
590  for rows where A = 1 
 enforced for all access 
enable;
select A from M1;
595 5.3 Database triggers
A database trigger is a critical database concept which applications depend upon to 
preserve data integrity. For example, a banking application may decide to use a trigger 
to ensure that each time a client’s balance is updated in the clients table, a row is inserted 
into the statements table to record that particular withdrawal or deposit transaction. So, 
600 why does the design of database security need to pay attention to database triggers? 
Consider the banking application example above. Suppose that the clients table is 
protected with a set of row permissions and column masks. If such row permissions and 
column masks are blindly applied, then it may not be possible to update the statements 
table as the required input data could have been filtered out or masked. Clearly, this 
605 approach would negatively impact data integrity.
A better approach is therefore to not enforce the row permissions or column masks 
on the clients table. However, not doing so may affect security as the data in the clients 
table now becomes visible to any triggers defined on such table and may be abused. In 
this context, we have extended the database system by introducing the notion of a 
610 secure trigger. By default, a database trigger is not secure, but the administrator can 
alter the trigger’s definition to mark it secure. This means that the administrator vouches 
for the trigger as trusted and can be applied on a table protected with row permission or 
column mask constructs. Secure triggers enable database security and triggers to coexist 
in harmony.
615 6. Performance evaluation
We have conducted 4 different assessments during our performance evaluation. The 
assessments were conducted using IBM DB2, extended with our fine-grained 
authorization model, deployed on a dedicated AIX system with 8 processors @ 1452 
GHz and 32GB of RAM.  This is a fully dedicated system (CPU, memory, networking 
620 and storage) running only our experiment to ensure performance data stability. The time 
elapsed for a given query is measured from the time the query is submitted to the time 
the results are returned. Before a query is run, the database system is activated to ensure 
a fresh database set up. The query is run several times. The first run is discarded from 
the statistics as the database bufferpool (i.e., database cache) is cold.
625  Assessment 1: The goal of this assessment is to measure the impact to 
performance when an application chooses to delegate fine-grained 
authorization to the database. One of the key advantages of our fine-grained 
authorization model is that it relieves applications from the burden of 
enforcing fine-grained authorization by delegating such task to the 
630 database. But it is important that this reduction in application complexity 
does not result in any significant performance drawbacks for the 
application. This assessment confirmed that applications can safely 
delegate the enforcement of fine-grained database authorization to the 
database with no performance concerns. 
635  Assessment 2:  The objective of this assessment is to measure the 
scalability of column masks. Linear scalability has been confirmed by this 
assessment.
 Assessment 3: The goal of this assessment is to verify the independence of 
column masks. This assessment has shown that the impact of all column 
640 masks defined on a table is never higher than the sum of the impact of each 
column mask defined individually.
 Assessment 4:  The objective of this assessment is to measure the impact 
of row permissions. This test confirmed that the impact of row permissions 
is minimum. 
645 6.1 Delegating fine-grained authorization enforcement to the database 
system
Methodology
We have selected TPC-H [19] as the application with which to conduct our 
assessment. TPC-H is an industry standard benchmark for measuring database 
650 performance. It consists of 22 queries representative of decision support systems that 
examine large volumes of data. The performance metric reported by TPC-H is called 
the TPC-H Composite Query-per-Hour Performance Metric (QphH) and reflects 
multiple aspects of the capability of the database system to process queries. 
We focused on two scenarios in our assessment. In the first scenario, we created a 
655 set of column masks and row permissions on the TPC-H database schema to specify a 
fine-grained authorization policy. Then, we ran the TPC-H benchmark and measured 
the QphH. In the second scenario, we created no column masks or row permissions in 
the database. Instead, we modified the SQL queries, so the same fine-grained 
authorization is enforced by the application.
660 Table 1 summarizes our findings. The ratio column represents the QphH of the fine-
grained authorization policy delegated to the database divided by the QphH when that 
policy is enforced by the application itself and is plotted in Fig. 3. The numbers on the 
x-axis of this figure represent the 22 TPC-H queries referred to in Table 1. That is, 1 
represents query Q1, 2 represents query Q2 and so on. 
665
Discussion
Fig. 3 shows that almost all the TPC-H queries perform the same or better when the 
policy is enforced by the database than by the application. More specifically, 13 queries 
performed fairly the same in both scenarios. 8 queries performed better when the fine-
670 grained authorization policy is enforced by the database system (i.e., the ones where 
the ratio column is coloured in green in table 1). The improvement observed ranges 
from 8 to 68%. Lastly, for query Q19, we observed a performance degradation of 15% 
when the fine-grained authorization policy is enforced by the database.









675 Fig. 3. Ratio of database vs application enforcement for TPC-H queries.









Q1 1158.8 370 0.3193
Q2 19.7 12 0.6091
Q3 2350.6 2321.6 0.9877
Q4 6105.6 6103.4 0.9996
Q5 7352.6 6371.5 0.8666
Q6 27.8 25.6 0.9209
Q7 16654.1 16657.5 1.0002
Q8 884.2 882.5 0.9981
Q9 9653.8 9475.7 0.9816
Q10 8376.5 8367.3 0.9989
Q11 138.7 127.5 0.9193
Q12 112.6 113.6 1.0089
Q13 103.5 105.7 1.0213
Q14 22.8 14.4 0.6316
Q15 26.7 18.3 0.6854
Q16 24.3 24 0.9877
Q17 336.3 336.2 0.9997
Q18 288.5 291.9 1.0118
Q19 93.6 107.6 1.1496
Q20 73.9 70.8 0.9581
Q21 9655.1 9644.6 0.9989
Q22 90.9 32.9 0.3619
There are two main reasons for the results observed. First, the order in which 
predicates are evaluated is important, particularly for table joins. For example, consider 
680 the following query where tables T1 and T2 are joined on column C1: “SELECT * 
FROM T1 INNER JOIN T2 on T1.C1 = T2.C1”.  When a row permission is enforced 
by an application, the application will modify the query above by adding the row 
permission predicates to the SQL text directly as follows: “SELECT * FROM T1 
INNER JOIN T2 on T1.C1 = T2.C1 AND <row permission predicate>”. Recall from 
685 section 3 that we extended the SQL compiler so that, by default, the row permissions 
predicates are evaluated first on the table to guard against potential data leakage by any 
unsafe predicates in the query. So, when the database enforces the fine-grained 
authorization policy, the query would actually look as follows within the SQL compiler 
“SELECT * FROM (SELECT * FROM T1 WHERE <row permission predicate>) 
690 INNER JOIN T1 on T1.C1 = T2.C1”. However, when there are no unsafe predicates in 
the query, we do not restrict the SQL compiler optimizer component from moving the 
row permission predicates higher or lower in the query graph if it leads to a better query 
execution plan. This was the case in our testing as we had no unsafe predicates. The 
only situation where the SQL compiler optimizer component did not move the predicate 
695 was for query Q19. This is because the row permission defined on the table did not refer 
to any data in the table itself as it was a simple rule to check whether or not the user 
issuing the query were a member of a given role. Consequently, the optimizer selected 
a merge-join instead of a hash-join [20] [21]. Normally, the merge-join would have 
performed better but because the row permission did not actually filter any rows, the 
700 merge-join ended up being more expensive, thus the observed degradation in query 
Q19.
The second reason for the results observed is how column masks are processed. 
When the database system enforces a column mask, it does so internally within the 
actual query graph built by the SQL compiler. So, when the same column appears 
705 multiple times within a query the SQL compiler does not need to duplicate the column 
masks. However, when the fine-grained authorization policy is enforced by the 
application, the rules representing the column mask end up being duplicated in the SQL 
query text as the application can only work with SQL. This explains the performance 
gain observed when the fine-grained authorization policy is enforced by the database.
710 Our tests have shown that enforcing the fine-grained database authorization policy 
by the database has not resulted in any significant performance drawbacks for the 
application. This means that the gains in security and the reduction in application 
complexity do not come at the expense of application SQL workload performance.
6.2 Scalability of column masks
715 Methodology
We have created a table T1 with 10 columns, all of the same type. We have populated 
the table with random data. No indices of any type were created on this table. We have 
run a “SELECT * FROM T1” as our baseline. Then, we created a column mask on the 
first column, ran the same query above and measured its performance. We have 
720 repeated this process for each of the remaining columns. The column mask created is 
exactly the same for each column. We have run the experiment twice: One where T1 
contains one million rows and another one where it contains ten million rows.  Table 2 
summarizes our findings. 
725 TABLE 2: Time elapsed (in seconds).
Test 1,000,000 rows 10,000,000 rows
Baseline (No Masks) 4.58 44.26
1 Mask 4.73 45.97
2 Masks 4.74 46.45
3 Masks 4.83 46.85
4 Masks 4.82 47.06
5 Masks 4.87 47.48
6 Masks 5 48.28
7 Masks 4.97 48.8
8 Masks 5.02 49.01
9 Masks 5.08 49.96
10 Masks 5.10 50
Discussion
Fig. 4 shows that for both the one million and ten million rows cases, the execution 
time of our query scales almost in a linear manner as the number of masks increases. 
730 This confirms our expectation as our design and implementation of column masks did 
not introduce any additional logic for coordinating the execution of multiple masks 
when they are present on a given table. Essentially, the overhead introduced is only the 
one associated with the execution of the actual rule expressed in the column mask 
definition itself. In our experimentation, the rule was checking user membership in a 
735 role to decide whether they see the actual column value or a masked version thereof. It 
used the built-in SQL function VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER. This function is highly 
optimized. It keeps an in-memory list of users to roles mappings, making it very fast to 
decide whether or not a user is a member in a given role. We introduced this function 
to support the adoption of our row permissions and column masks as security best 
740 practices advocate for simplifying the management of authorization by assigning 
privileges to roles and assigning users to roles.  Authorization then simply becomes 
checking user membership in roles.
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745 Fig. 4. Scalability of column masks.
6.3 Independence of column masks
Methodology
We have created three column masks on the CUSTOMER table in the TPC-H 
database schema: A simple column mask, an intermediate column mask, and complex 
750 column mask. The simple column mask is similar to the column mask shown in 
Example 2. It makes use of a single call to function VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER to 
check whether the user is a member of the given role. The intermediate column mask 
has four calls to the VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER function. Lastly, the complex 
column mask is similar to the intermediate one but has a sub-select statement on top of 
755 that. 
Our base line is a “SELECT * FROM CUSTOMER” query with no column masks 
defined on the CUSTOMER table. We ran this query, measured the elapsed time, and 
then performed the following tests:
 Run the same query with only the simple column mask enabled.
760  Run the same query with only the intermediate column mask enabled.
 Run the same query with only the complex column mask enabled.
 Run the same query with all three column masks enabled.
Table 3 shows the time elapsed for each test when the CUSTOMER table contains 
one million rows, and ten million rows respectively. Table 4 shows the difference 
765 compared to the baseline for each of the tests conducted.
TABLE 3: Time elapsed (in seconds).
Test 1,000,000 rows 10,000,000 rows
Baseline (No Masks) 37.464 371.791
Simple Mask 38.812 387.457
Intermediate Mask 40.356 404.619
Complex Mask 58.592 556.439
All Masks 61.855 589.25
TABLE 4: Difference with the baseline.
Test 1,000,000 rows 10,000,000 rows
Simple Mask 1.348 15.666
Intermediate Mask 2.892 32.828
Complex Mask 21.128 184.648
Sum of all Masks 25.368 233.142
All Masks 24.391 217.459
770
Discussion
Fig. 5 contrasts the sum of the differences to the baseline for each of the simple, 
775 intermediate, and complex mask tests with the difference to the baseline for the test 
where all masks are enabled at the same time for both the one million rows and ten 
million rows cases. For both cases, we can observe that the difference with the baseline 
when all masks are enabled at the same time is never higher than the sum of the 
differences to the baseline for each individual mask. This confirms our expectation as 
780 our column masks design and implementation did not require introducing any 
coordination when multiple masks are enabled at the same time. The masks are in fact 
totally independent from each other.
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785 Fig. 5. Independence of column masks.
6.4 Row permissions impact
Methodology
We have created three row permissions on the CUSTOMER table in the TPC-H 
database schema: One row permission that returns zero rows, one permission that 
790 returns 50% of the rows, and another row permission that returns all rows. We have run 
“SELECT * FROM CUSTOMERS” as our baseline. Then, we run the same query with 
each of the row permissions above enabled individually (i.e. one row permission at a 
time).  Table 5 shows the time elapsed for each test when the CUSTOMER table 
contains one million rows and ten million rows respectively.
795
TABLE 5: Time elapsed (in seconds).
Test 1,000,000 rows 10,000,000 rows
Baseline (No Permissions) 38.163 380.118
Permission (0 rows) 0.11 3.173
Permission (50% rows) 19.679 169.154
Permission (All rows) 38.679 383.93
Discussion
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 contrast the performance for each of the 3 tests with our baseline 
800 for the one million rows and ten million rows respectively. The results are similar for 
each case and show that the overhead of row permissions is very minimal. For instance, 
when the row permission returns all rows, the performance is almost identical to the 
baseline. This is expected as the rule expressed in the row permission is internally 
implemented as a predicate. In our case, the predicate includes the built-in 
805 VERIFY_ROLE_FOR_USER SQL function. If a DBA decides to deploy their own 
UDF for use in a row permission definition, the performance implications may be 
different depending on several factors such as how optimized that UDF is and whether 
or not it is declared as trusted. 
810



















Fig. 6. Row permissions impact (1,000,000 rows).



















Fig. 7. Row permissions impact (10,000,000 rows).
7. Use case scenario
815 We describe how our row permissions and column masks can be applied to meet the 
needs of a banking application. All the SQL statements and outputs below have been 
fully verified with our implementation on IBM DB2. These requirements can be 
summarized as follows:
 Customer service representatives and telemarketers can see all data.
820  Tellers can see only the data for their own branch customers.
 The customer account number is accessible only by customer service 
representatives. All other users can only see the last 4 digits. 
Customer information is stored in a table called CUSTOMER and bank employee 
information is stored in a table called EMPLOYEE_INFO. The SQL statements for 
825 creating these two tables are given below.
create table customer (account varchar (9), 
              name varchar (20), 
              income int, 
830               branch char (1) );
create table employee_info (branch char (1),
          emp_id varchar (10) );
We assume that tables CUSTOMER and EMPLOYEE_INFO are already populated. 
Their content is given by tables 6 and 7 respectively.
835
TABLE 6: CUSTOMER table.
ACCOUNT NAME INCOME BRANCH
1234-5678 Alice 22,000 A
2345-6754 Bob 71,000 B
3456-1298 Carl 123,000 B
4672-8901 David 172,000 C





840 Tellers, customer service representatives, and telemarketers are members of database 
roles TELLER, CSR, and TELEMARKETER respectively. SELECT privilege to the 
CUSTOMER table is granted to these three roles. Users Amy, Pat and Haytham are a 
teller, a customer service representative and a telemarketer respectively. The SQL 
statements for setting up these roles are given below.
845
create role teller;
grant select on customer to role teller;
grant role teller to user amy;
create role csr;
850 grant select on customer to role csr;
grant role csr to user pat; 
create role telemarketer;
grant select on customer to role telemarketer;
grant role telemarketer to user haytham;
855 To implement the first rule which states that customer service representatives and 
telemarketers can see all customers, the following row permission must be created.
create permission csr_row_access on customer 
 for rows where verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘csr’) = 1 or
860                 verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘telemarketer’) = 1
 enforced for all access
 enable;
To implement the second rule which states that tellers can only see customers of their 
865 own branch, the following row permissions must be created. The sub-select in the 
permission definition ensures that the customer’s branch and the teller’s branch match.
create permission teller_row_access on customer 
 for rows where verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘teller’) = 1 and
870               branch = (select branch from employee_info
          where emp_id = USER)
 enforced for all access
 enable;
875 To implement the third rule, the following column mask is created. The mask ensures 
that when the user is not a member of the CSR role, they see only the last 4 digits of the 
account number. The rest of the digits are replaced by “X”s for them (masked out). 
create mask csr_column_access on customer
880  for column account 
 return case when verify_role_for_user (USER, ‘csr’) = 1
          then account
          else 'XXXX-‘ || SUBSTR(ACCOUNT,5,4)
            end
885  enable;   
Now that the row permissions and column masks have been defined, any future 
access to the CUSTOMER table will see the database system automatically enforce the 
security policy. Table 8 contrasts the output when the application issues the query 
“SELECT * FROM CUSTOMER” for users Amy, Haytham and Pat respectively. 
890 When the application issues that query on behalf of user Amy, the database only 
returns the rows for customers from branch A, which is where Amy works. Note that 
the account number is masked out because Amy is not a member of the CSR role.
On the other hand, when the application issues the exact same query on behalf of 
user Haytham, the database returns all the rows in the table which is in accordance with 
895 the first rule because Haytham is a telemarketer. Note that the account number is still 
masked out because Haytham is not a member of the CSR role.
Lastly, when the same query is issued on behalf of user Pat, all the rows in the table 
are returned and the account number is not masked out because Pat is a member of the 
CSR role. 
900
TABLE 8: Output for users Amy, Haytham and Pat.
USER ACCOUNT NAME INCOME BRANCH
Amy XXXX-5678 Alice 22,000 A
Haytham XXXX-5678 Alice 22,000 A
XXXX-6754 Bob 71,000 B
XXXX-1298 Carl 123,000 B
XXXX-8901 David 172,000 C
Pat 1234-5678 Alice 22,000 A
2345-6754 Bob 71,000 B
3456-1298 Carl 123,000 B
4672-8901 David 172,000 C
This example has shown how the application logic can remain very simple. In all 3 
user situations, the application simply issues the simple “SELECT * FROM 
905 CUSTOMERS” SQL query. The database system automatically applies the fine-
grained authorization rules, relieving the application from this burden, which in turn 
contributes to reducing the complexity of the application. 
8. Conclusion
The rise of data breaches has driven many organizations nowadays to implement 
910 zero-trust security in order to reduce the risk of incurring a data breach. Like identity 
systems and networks, database systems also need to evolve to help organizations 
effectively adhere to zero-trust security. This is particularly important as database 
systems store an enterprise’s most critical data and are often the primary target of 
attacks by both insiders and outsiders. This paper has introduced three new concepts to 
915 enable database systems for zero-trust security. Row permissions and column masks 
provide data-centric security so the security policy cannot be bypassed as with database 
views for example. They also coexist in harmony with the rest of the database core 
tenets so that enterprises are not forced to compromise neither security nor database 
functionality. Trusted contexts provide applications in multitiered environments with a 
920 secure and controlled manner to propagate end user identities to the database and 
therefore enable such applications to delegate the security policy to the database system 
where it is enforced more effectively. They also protect against application bypass so 
the application credentials cannot be abused to make database changes outside the 
scope of the application’s business logic. 
925 In our future work, we plan to focus on facilitating the adoption of our fine-grained 
database authorization model. For example, defining a column mask is a very easy task 
once you know which column to define it on. But in some situations, this knowledge 
may not be available (e.g., a database inherited through a merger or an acquisition). 
This is where data classification would be useful. The main challenges in this context 
930 would be to investigate how to do the data classification on the database efficiently and 
accurately. Additionally, we want to explore machine learning for automatically 
generating the appropriate row permissions and column masks. Machine learning has 
been explored for detecting threats [22], [23], [24], but here we would like to explore it 
for fine-grained authorization policy recommendation.
935 Lastly, Fig. 8 gives a visual summary for how our row permissions, column masks 
and trust contexts contrast with the prior art. Multilevel Security (MLS) provides high 
security but is the least flexible because its authorization rules are rigid and cannot be 
changed. Database views and application-based fine-grained authorization provide high 
flexibility but the protection they offer can be bypassed by accessing the base tables 
940 directly. Oracle VPD, Microsoft RLS/DDM, Sybase RLAC and Vertica RAP/CAP 
improve over database views and application-based fine-grained authorization. Our 
approach provides an additional improvement by addressing the loss of user identity 
problem in multitiered environments and by coexisting safely with the rest of the 
database core tenets.
945
Fig. 8. Row permissions, column masks, trusted contexts and prior art.
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